Compatibilist theories of free will and the could-have-done-otherwise principle
Many claim that, in order for a choice to be free in any sense that matters, it must be true that the agent could have done otherwise. They take this principle -- van Inwagen calls it the "principle of alternate possibilities" -- to be a necessary condition for freedom. For instance, if a scientist puts a machine in Bob's brain that makes him kill the President, his action was not free, for Bob couldn't have done otherwise. Incompatibilists often appeal to this principle to show that determinism cannot be reconciled with free will. "If a decision is completely determined by the past," they ask, "how could the agent have decided to do something else?" Compatibilists often reply that what's important is not simply that the agent could have done otherwise, but that the agent could have done otherwise if he or she had wanted to. Moreover, some compatibilists, such as Frankfurt or Dennett, argue that there are clear cases where the agent couldn't have done otherwise, but that the agent's choice was still free: what if Bob really wanted to kill the President and the machine in Bob's brain would only kick in if Bob lost his nerve? If Bob went through with it on his own, surely the act would be free. Incompatibilists claim that the problem with this idea is that what Bob "wanted" was determined before Bob was conceived.
More sophisticated analyses of compatibilist free will have been offered. A free action may require not only liberty from external coercion, but also liberty from internal conflicts. Compulsive behaviors and the actions of the insane are thus not free. Moreover, our common sense conceptions of free will also demand the possibility that an agent could act rationally or irrationally with equanimity. In either case, what we mean by free will could be that an agent can claim ownership of his or her will despite external or internal influences.
The science of free will
Throughout the history of science, attempts have been made to answer the question of free will using scientific principles. Early scientific thought often pictured the universe as deterministic, and some assumed that it was simply a matter of gathering sufficient information to be able to predict future events with perfect accuracy. However, most interpretations of quantum mechanics suggest that the universe may actually be indeterministic.
Like physicists, biologists have also frequently addressed the question of free will. One of the most heated debates of biology is that of "nature versus nurture". How important are genetics and biology in human behavior compared to culture and environment? Genetic studies have identified many specific genetic factors that affect the personality of the individual, from obvious cases such as Down's syndrome to more subtle effects such as a statistical predisposition towards schizophrenia. However, it is not certain that environmental determination is less threatening to free will than genetic determination.
It has also become possible to study the living brain and researchers can now watch the decision-making "machinery" involved in what is commonly referred to as free will. A seminal experiment in this field was conducted by Benjamin Libet in the 1980s, wherein he asked subjects to choose a random moment to flick their wrist while he watched the associated activity in their brains. Libet found that the brain activity leading up to the subject flicking their wrist began approximately one-third of a second before the subject consciously decided to move, suggesting that the decision was actually first being made on a subconscious level and only afterward being translated into a "conscious decision." A related experiment performed later by Dr. Alvaro Pascual-Leone involved asking subjects to choose at random which of their hands to move. He found that by stimulating different hemispheres of the brain using magnetic fields it was possible to strongly influence which hand the subject picked. Normally right-handed people would choose to move their right hand 60% of the time, for example, but when the right hemisphere was stimulated they would instead choose their left hand 80% of the time (recall that the right hemisphere of the brain is responsible for the left side of the body, and the left hemisphere for the right). Despite the external influence on their decision-making, the subjects continued to report that they believed their choice of hand had been made freely.
In Theology
The theological doctrine of divine foreknowledge is often alleged to be in conflict with human freedom. After all, if God knows exactly what will happen, right down to every choice one makes, how can one's choices be free? God's already-true or timelessly-true knowledge about your choices seems to constrain your freedom. This problem is related to the Aristotelian problem of the sea-battle: tomorrow there will or will not be a sea-battle. If there will be one, then it was true yesterday that there would be one. Then it would be necessary that the sea battle will occur. If there won't be one, then by similar reasoning, it is necessary that it won't occur. This means that the future, whatever it is, is completely fixed by past truths -- true propositions about the future. In Christian theology, God is described as not only omniscient but omnipotent, which would seem to imply that not only has God always known what choices you will make tomorrow, but actually chose what you would choose. That is, by virtue of His foreknowledge He knows what will influence your choices, and by virtue of His omnipotence He controls those factors. This becomes especially important for the doctrines relating to salvation. Most Christians find ways of avoiding the conclusion that God predestines who will be saved and who damned, but Calvinists embrace it. Arminians believe that humans always have free will, but God's prevenient grace is always calling them.
Some philosophers believe that free will is equivalent to having a soul, and thus that (at least some) animals don't have free will.
One possible response to the problems of an omniscient God and free will is "open theism." This position holds that God does not know the future because, quite simply, the future does not exist. That contrary to science fiction, the future is not "out there," waiting for us to live through it. And so, with this position one can espouse a God who knows everything there is to know, including all the millions of possibilities/alternatives that the future holds, but he does not know the future because the future, not existing, is not knowable.
In the case of a divine prophecy, it is not that God knows all the future, but that he knows that he will bring this or that to pass, and so, as the all-powerful God, that much is indeed certain and determined.
A further problem with Calvinism is that the Bible is clear that "God is not willing that any should perish." Of course, Calvinism's "double predestination" (i.e., some predestined to heaven, others to hell) falls prey to this scripture, along with scriptures that indicate that one can have their name removed from the Book of Life.
A wholistic view of scripture seems to indicate that some events are predetermined...and some are not. This permits God to predestine some to salvation, without predestining anyone to hell. That is, some are free to choose, and while their choice may take them to hell, it would not be because God preferred it in the sense of forcing it to happen.
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