This article is about those who carry out assassinations and their history. For other meanings of the word assassin, see Assassin (disambiguation)
In its most common use, assassin has come to mean someone who kills (assassinates) an important person, usually for ideological or political reasons. The immediate motivation for an assassin may be money (in the case of a hit man), opposition to a person's beliefs or belief systems (in the case of a fanatic, for example), orders from a government (often carried about by a subversive agent such as a spy), or loyalty to a competing leader or group.
Thus an assassination is a kind of murder, but sometimes with the less negative connotation of killing an enemy.
Assassin, like companion terms such as terrorist and freedom fighter, is often considered to be a loaded term. The definition of assassin is generally much clearer than the others. Most assassins appear comfortable enough with their deed to describe it as such publicly, whereas few people would call themselves terrorists.
Marco Polo provided the first western account of the sect, although his account is probably fictionalized in part. He said that recruits were promised Paradise in return for dying in action. They were drugged, often with materials such as hashish (although some suggest opium and wine instead, all being, nonetheless, condemned by Islam) then spirited away to a garden stocked with attractive and compliant women and fountains of wine. At this time, they were awakened and it was explained to them that such was their reward for the deed, convincing them that their leader, Hassan-i-Sabah, could open the gates to Paradise. The name assassin is derived from either hasishin for the supposed influence of their attacks and disregard for their own lives in the process, or hassansin for their leader.
Unlike some topics, notably terrorism, wherein there is a substantial grey area and often bitter controversy between which specific instances qualify or even what standards should be used, the "common sense" classification of assassination stated at the outset of this article seems to stand with few objections. However, this does open larger issues concerning interpretation, notably regarding attempted killings by those with other motives — is it an assassination simply if the person is a major leader or public figure espousing a cause, or only if the assassin's reason for the attack is due to these person's status as a figurehead for a particular issue?
Notable instances in which this definitive problem might come into effect include the assassination attempt against United States PresidentRonald Reagan by John Hinckley, who was determined subsequently to have serious psychological problems and publicly stated his intent was to get the attention of actress Jodie Foster rather than make any political statement. The killing of former BeatleJohn Lennon would raise the same problem — despite his outspokenness on many liberal political issues, the killer does not seem to have been more than an unstable fan (although it may be of note that the word is derived from fanatic). The attempt on the life of President Gerald Ford by a member of Charles Manson's cult could be the same; while it might perhaps be considered part and parcel of the anti-government, neo-fascist ideology to which Manson and his group adhered, Lynette Fromme, the assassin, was not widely considered legally competent in her judgment at the time (although she was
later tried and convicted). Were these killings, assuming success, to be classified as murders or assassinations? The issue is further complicated by the fact that while Lennon was likely as outspoken politically as Reagan and Ford, and certainly as famous, Reagan and Ford were elected officials at the time, possibly requiring different criteria for his case.
One can take one of three positions (note that this consideration is of necessity strictly based upon language, not law): that the killing of someone only for political, moral, or ideological reasons constitutes an assassination (hence neither Reagan nor Lennon were the victims of assassins' attacks, while Ford was), that the killing of someone serving in politics or public office counts (thus Reagan's and Ford's attackers were would-be assassins, while Lennon's killer was not), or that anyone with a significant level of political involvement would be an assassination victim in the event of their murder (in which case all three instances would be assassinations or attempts).
While it must be acknowledged that attempting to read a person's thoughts is both imperfect and somewhat antithetical to the nature of such an issue, for the purposes of this article the first, most conservative definition is taken — while it is likely the second is the most popular, the first is technically the most correct (while the third is generally considered to be too general in application). Therefore, all assassinations or attempts mentioned in the article will strictly follow the guidelines outlined at the outset to prevent confusion.
Some would argue that assassination is one of the oldest tools of power politics, dating back to the earliest governments of the world — Philip II of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, met his end this way. It is a fact, however, that by the rise of Rome assassination had become a commonly-accepted tool towards the end not only of improving one's own position, but to influence policy — the killing of Julius Caesar being a notable example, though many Emperors met such an end. In whatever case, there seems to have not been a good deal of moral indignation at the practice amongst the political circles of the time, save, naturally, by the affected.
As the Middle Ages came about from the fall of the Roman Empire, the moral and ethical dimensions of what was before a simple political tool began to take shape. Although in that period intentional regicide was an extremely rare occurrence, the situation changed dramatically with the Renaissance when the ideas of tyrannomachy (i.e. killing of a King when his rule becomes tyrannical) re-emerged and gained recognition. Many a head of state of the time fell at the hands of an assassin, such as Henri III and Henry IV of France. There were notable detractors, however; Abd-ul-Mejid of the Ottoman Empire refused to put to death plotters against his life during his reign.
The Cold War saw a dramatic increase in the number of political assassinations, likely in large part due to the ideological polarization of most of the First and Second worlds, whose adherents were more than willing to both justify and finance such killings. During the Kennedy era Fidel Castro narrowly escaped death on several occasions at the hands of the CIA and CIA-backed rebels (there are accounts that exploding clams and poisoned shoes were employed); some allege that Salvador Allende of Chile was another example, though specific proof is lacking. At the same time, the KGB made creative use of assassination to deal with high-profile defectors such as Georgi Markov, and Israel's Mossad made use of such tactics to eliminate Palestinianguerrillas, politicians and revolutionaries, though some Israelis argue that the targeted often toed the line between one or another or were even all three.
Most major powers were not long in repudiating such tactics, for example during the presidency of Gerald Ford in the United States in 1976. Many allege, however, that this is merely a smoke screen for political and moral benefit and that the covert and illegal training of assassins by major intelligence agencies continue, such as at the School of the Americas run by the United States. In fact, the debate over the use of such tactics is not closed by any means; many accuse Russia of continuing to practice it in Chechnya and against Chechens abroad, as well as Israel in Palestine and against Palestinians abroad and Palestinians and other Arab nations against Jews in Israel and abroad; The United Kingdom, through its Special Air Service and Force Research Unit have also conducted assassinations of Irish Republican Army members and sympathizers both in Northern Ireland and elsewhere in the world.
Proponents of assassination as a political tool point out that it can be a very effective and inexpensive way to prevent loss of life. Opponents of assassination bring up a number of objections. The first is that assassination is essentially the death penalty stripped of the normal judicial safeguards that limit its use. Second, opponents of assassination question its effectiveness. Most conventional military and political organizations are robust so that the death of the leader would not cause them to collapse. Furthermore, using assassination against a terrorist or guerilla organization may result in the complete elimination of the known leaders of that organization, but create a set of unknown leaders who cannot then be located. Finally, assassination makes a negotiation of surrender impossible. Near the end of World War II, for example, Allied forces made specific efforts not to target the political and military leadership of the Axis Powers specifically so that there would be someone to authorize a surrender.
Entire organizations have sometimes specialized in assassination as one of their services, to be gained for the right price. Besides the original hashshashin, the ninja clans of Japan were rumored to perform assassinations — though it can be pointed out that most of what was ever known about the ninja was rumor and hearsay. In the United States, Murder Incorporated, an organization partnered to the Mafia, was formed for the sole purpose of performing assassinations for organized crime. In Russia, the vory (thieves), their version of the Mafia, are often known to provide assassinations for the right price, as well as engaging in it themselves for their own purposes.
While assassination for military purposes has long been espoused — Sun Tzu argued for such in The Art of War, as did Machiavelli in his Art of War — many analysts hold the belief that such a system would not be of any significant use in a strategic way. In medieval times, for instance, an army and even a nation might be based upon and around a particularly strong, canny or charismatic leader, whose loss could paralyze the ability of both to make war. However, in modern warfare a soldier's mindset is generally considered to surround ideals far more than specific leaders. Theoretically, while the death of a soldier's leader would (and does) have a detrimental effect on morale, the comfort of the cause for which they fight is far more sustainable than such supposedly-transitive loyalty to a single person.
Also, assassinating a military leader runs the risk of eliminating a later advocate of peace, as many would argue that military leaders, seeing the face of warfare and bearing a clearer sense of the war effort's effects, have more sagacity on the subject. Not only that, but worse, there is a high chance such a killing will be treated as not only reinforcing evidence of the opponents' moral bankruptcy, but also martyr the leader, rallying still others to an enemy cause and hardening the enemies' resolve to fight — and resist entreaties to peace (indeed, the death in battle of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, while not an assassination, led directly to the Catholic defeat at Lützen; as the infuriated Swedes rallied behind their fallen leader). Such an effect can be extremely detrimental to a group or state, but supporters might argue in return that when faced with a particularly brilliant leader, there's no choice but to take the chance and, essentially, hope for a more mediocre successor (one might use the example of the many attempts to kill the Athenian Alcibiades during the Peloponnesian War, the American shooting down of AdmiralYamamoto during World War II, or arguably Henri IV of France). Also, they might note that in a time-sensitive situation, such a killing could be useful if only to briefly buy time for a more permanent and effective plan to be set into motion or stall an army as reinforcements rush to the area.
Moral equivalence is also important when examining the use of assassination: no state that deliberately trains, hires, sanctiones or harbors an assassin operating outside the laws of war could hope to justify it in such a way that would satisfy its allies and neighbors, much less the affected nations (even though many might use the tactic themselves), argue opponents of "trial, judgment and execution by intelligence" as one American military officer put it. In democracies this issue is particularly crucial; much of the impetus for engaging in military action in such states is the motivation of perceived righteousness fighting a brutal enemy, an opinion that is undermined if one's nation is actively and openly engaged in killings outside the laws of war. Many would argue that the negative morale effects alone would outweigh any possible benefits.
Supporters of assassination as a policy reply, however, that often the killing of one problematic figure can spare countless lives and years — or even decades — of warfare. An example often cited is the question of what might have come to pass had Adolf Hitler been assassinated in 1935. Countless millions, the argument goes, would have been spared had only such intervention been taken. However, it could be argued that Adolf Hitler was just one man in a Nazi Party of hundreds, and his successor may be just as brutal (not to mention vengeful). Furthermore, it can be argued that this logic would justify not only killing
Hitler in 1935 but also killing the baby Hitler in his crib.
However, the widespread attention paid to deeds by dictators such as Saddam Hussein and Idi Amin is seen by many as another persuasive argument towards the necessity of eliminating such individuals. The increasing specter of terrorism, too, often leads many to question why, if it is "us or them," there should be any delay in taking such action (an opponent would likely be quick to reply, however, that such an action alone leads to the loss of moral equivalence, proving their above argument, although a likely counter could be that moral equivalence is of little use to either a terrorist or one of their victims).
It's entirely likely that the first strategy used by a political or religious killer was a remarkably simple one: find the leader and stab or bludgeon them to death with whatever weapons were available. This would likely have occurred only in close-knit groups where security was not thought needed, such as amongst nomadic or early sedentary peoples in Mesopotamia where disagreements would be solved with vigilantism (however it's important to note that information from this far back is very sketchy and debatable in nature). As civilization took root, however, any leaders in groups began to have more and more a position of importance, they would become more detached from the groups they ruled. For the first time, subterfuge would become a major factor in engaging in assassination.
From ancient times, then, through to the medieval period, as the rate of technology was slow so, too, would be the changes in assassins' tactics. Source | Copyright
